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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of foreign institutional ownership on contemporaneous stock return volatility
in Indonesia. In this study, return volatility is measured as standard deviation of daily stockreturns. The
dynamic panel data results based on System GMM (S-GMM) estimation, confirm that foreign institutional
ownership tend to linearly and convexly increase monthly stock return volatility.The linear impact seems to be
weaker for stocks with higher market capitalization, but stronger for stocks with higher turnover.Furthertest
reveals that foreign financial institutional ownershiplinearly contributes to return volatility upsurge, while
foreign non-financial corporation ownership convexly contribute to return volatility increase.The additional
test also uncovers that domestic financial and non-financial institutionalownerships do not impact return
volatility.
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FOREIGN INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND
STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY IN INDONESIA
The debate on the benefits and costs of
opening up capital markets in emerging econo-
mies is far from over. Since domestic emerging
market volatility tends to be larger than devel-
oped market, some studies reveal that one of the
benefits ofliberalizing local capital market islower
cost of capital (Bekaert & Harvey, 1997; Henry,
2000). In fact, Bekaert & Harvey (2000)reveals that
the cost of capital in emerging economies decreases
between 5 and 75 basis points after capital market
liberalization. Other evidence suggests other ben-
efits of emerging market liberalization. It facilitates
international information transmission (Bae,
Ozoguz, Tan, & Wirjanto, 2012), improves corpo-
rate governance (Huang & Zhu, 2014), increases
stock market trading and capitalization (de la Torre,
Gozzi, & Schmukler, 2007), and spurs economic
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growth (Bekaert, Harvey, & Lundblad, 2005;
Bekaert, Harvey, & Lundblad, 2011).
However, other studiesdiscover that capi-
tal market liberalization does not bring significant
benefits. Ithas not created faster growth, but has
created greater externalities and risks (Stiglitz,
2002).Furthermore, the welfare gain from open-
ing up the capital market is negligible compared
to welfare gain from improving domestic produc-
tivity (Gourinchas & Jeanne, 2006).
After few incidences of financial crises, one
prominent growing concern discussed in the lit-
erature is whether foreign capital flowand partici-
pation increase emerging stock market volatility.
Volatility is an important aspect in financial eco-
nomics, due to its strong relations with expected
return, international risk sharing,andcost of capi-
tal. Bekaert & Harvey (1997) suggest that capital
market liberalization may increase or decrease
emerging market volatility, depending on the prior
state of the market. If domestic factors are more
volatile than world factors, liberalization may re-
duce stock volatility. On the contrary, if interna-
tional market risk is higher than domestic market
risk, the liberalization may increase volatility. In-
deed, empirical studies generate inconclusive re-
sults whether foreign ownership and trade reduce
or increase local emerging market volatility.
Some studies support the notion that open-
ing up emerging capital market to foreign inves-
tor reduces stock return volatility. The result based
on 25 emerging markets, suggest that financial lib-
eralization leads to reduction of total stock return
volatility(Umutlu, Akdeniz, & Altay-Salih, 2010).
Another study of 31 emerging markets, also finds
that large foreign ownership reduces stock return
volatility(Li, Nguyen, Pham, & Wei, 2011). Simi-
lar result is exhibited in a study based on the re-
moval of ownership restrictions on China’s A-share
market. It confirms that foreign institutions tend
to stabilize Chinese stock market (Schuppli & Bohl,
2010).
In contrast, other studies reveal that foreign
investor participation in emerging market increases
volatility. Based on 45 emerging markets data, Bae,
Chan, & Ng (2004) find that highly investible
emerging market stocks tend to exhibit higher
stock return volatility. Meanwhile, foreign equity
trading exhibits the highest explanatory power for
market volatility in Indonesia and Thailand (Wang,
2007). Even after controlling for other factors, for-
eign institutional ownership in China increases
firm-level return volatility (Chen, Du, Li, &
Ouyang, 2013).
Due to 1997 Asian financial crisis, Indonesia
has liberalized completely its capital market since
January 28, 1998. Since then, foreign investors are
allowed to buy all outstanding shares of Indone-
sian listed companies. In Indonesian Rupiah (IDR)
terms, domestic investor ownership increases from
around IDR 379 trillion in 2009 to slightly more
than IDR 1,040 trillion in 2012. During the same
period, foreign investor ownership increases from
about IDR 772 trillion to around IDR 1,484 tril-
lion. In terms of proportion, domestic ownership
increases from 32.90 percent in 2009 to 58.79 per-
cent in 2012, while foreign ownership decreases
from 67.10 percent to 58.79 percent.
To increase global competitiveness and li-
quidity of Indonesian capital market, on Decem-
ber 1, 2007, Jakarta Stock Exchange and Surabaya
Stock Exchange merged themselves to become the
Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX).Moreover, to
protect unwarranted trade and manipulation,
starting on February 1, 2012, the Indonesian Cen-
tral Securities Depository (ICSD) implements Single
Investor Identification (SID) system. The system
requires stock brokers to identify the ultimate
owner of each trade submitted to IDX. SID imple-
mentation makes more detailed stock ownership
classification data readily available.
This study is motivated at least by three rea-
sons. Firstly, SID implementation creates availabil-
ity of new more detailed stock ownership data.
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Secondly, although some studies have presented
evidence from Indonesian market, to the best of
author’s knowledge there has not been any study
on foreign institutional ownership impact on firm
level stock volatility. The closest paper is (Wang,
2013) which documents stabilizing effect of for-
eign ownership on future stock volatility. Apart
from the methodology, there are at least two main
differences: (1) his study does not use SID foreign
institutional ownership data which is crucial as
inferred in (Li, Nguyen, Pham, & Wei, 2011), (2)
his paper uses the Asian financial crisis as its pe-
riod of interest, while this study distances itself
from major financial crises period to minimize their
impact on stock return volatility. Thirdly, a coun-
try-specific study may generate different conclu-
sions from a cross-country study as shown in
China by (Chen, Du, Li, & Ouyang, 2013)compared
to (Li, Nguyen, Pham, & Wei, 2011)which also in-
cludes China as its sample.
Thispaper confirms that foreign institutional
ownership tend to linearly and convexly increase
contemporaneous monthly stock return volatility.
The results are drawn from dynamic panel data
models. The linear impact of foreign institutional
ownership seems to be weaker for stocks with
higher market capitalization, but stronger for
stocks with higher turnover. Further testsindicate
that foreign financial institutions linearlyin-
creaseconcomitant monthly stock return volatility.
Meanwhile, foreign non-financial corporation con-
vexly increase contemporaneous return volatility.
The additional test also concludes that domestic
financial and non-financial institutional
ownershipsdo not destabilizethe Indonesian mar-
ket.
The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section two discusses three main hypoth-
eses of this research. Section three presents data
and methodology. The methodology will explain
the dynamic panel data model. Section four pro-
vides and discusses the main results. Section five
delivers and deliberates the additional test results.
Section six offers some concluding remarks.
Main Hypotheses
Previous studies document that Indonesian
stock market is thin and illiquid. Foreign institu-
tional ownership in Indonesia tends to reduce li-
quidity, defying the view that foreign institutions
will improve liquidity(Rhee & Wang, 2009). Fur-
thermore, (Bonser-Neal, Linnan, & Neal, 1999)
discoverat least three facts about Indonesian mar-
ket: (1) transaction costs are higher to trade small
firms than to trade large firms; (2) price impact of
trades is higher for small firms than large firms;
and (3) trades initiated by foreign investors sig-
nificantly cause a larger impact on prices, than
trades initiated by domestic investors. Hence,the
presence of foreign institutions in Indonesian mar-
ket may increase volatility, due tolower stock
liquidityand higher price impact that they create.
Additionally, the impact of foreign institu-
tional ownership on volatility should be lower for
large stocks. When foreign institutions decide to
invest in large stocks, most likely they will trade
with other foreign or domestic institutions. It is
because institutional investors display “large firm
bias” where they like to invest in stocks with high
market liquidity (Dahlquist & Robertsson, 2001).
Price impact is higher when institutions trade with
individuals, but no such pattern is indicated when
institutions trade with each other (Stoffman, 2014).
There should be no investibility issue (Bae, Chan,
& Ng, 2004)between small and large stocks, since
all stocks are open to foreign investors.
Similar studies in Indonesia (Wang, 2013) and
China (Chen, Du, Li, & Ouyang, 2013) document
non-linear impact of foreign ownership to stock
volatility. Due to market illiquidity in Indonesia, I
deduce that foreign institutional ownership will
exhibit u-shape (convex) impact on stock return
volatility. Hence, three main hypotheses of this
research are as follows:
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Hypothesis one: Foreign institutional own-
ership increases stock volatility in Indonesian mar-
ket.
Hypothesis two: The positive impact of for-
eign institutional ownership on volatility is less
pronounced in larger size stocks.
Hypothesis three: Foreign institutional own-
ership exhibits non-linear (convex) impact on stock
volatility.
Data and Methodology
Data
This study collects end of month ownership
data of each stock from the Indonesian Central
Securities Depository (ICSD). Other data related
to price, transaction value, and number of out-
standing shares is collected from the Indonesian
Stock Exchange (IDX). In early 2012, there were
441 stocks listed in IDX. After removing stocks
experiencing suspensions and incomplete records,
this research only includes 422 stocks as the sample.
The sample period starts from February, 2012 un-
til September, 2013.
The sample should consist of 422 stocks
(cross-sections) and 20 months (periods), or 8440
balanced-panel observations. However, two un-
reliable observations are removed due to suspected
erroneous data recording leading to domestic in-
stitutional ownership that is more than 100 per-
cent. Two stocks displaying domestic institutional
ownership more than 100 percent are MEGA in
June 2013 and AGRO in August 2013.Hence, both
observations are removed and the sample is un-
balanced with 8438 observations.
Following SID classifications, I define insti-
tutional ownership as the sum of ownership of six
categories: (1) insurance, (2) pension fund, (3) in-
vestment bank, (4) mutual fund, (5) stock broker-
age company, and (6) corporation.
Variables
In this study, the dependent variable of in-
terest is firm-level stock return volatility (VOLAT),
while the main independent variable of interest is
foreign institutional ownership (FORINST).
VOLAT is monthly standard deviation of daily
stock returns, while FORINST is foreign institu-
tional ownership (in number of shares) divided
by total shares outstanding at the end of month.To
investigate non-linear impact of FORINST on
VOLAT, the modelalso uses the squared
ofFORINST (FORINST^2) as the independent vari-
able.
In addition, this study also employs three
main control variables: (1) DOMINST is domestic
institutional ownership of each stock (in number
of shares) divided by its total shares outstanding
at the end of month; (2) SIZE is natural logarithm
of each stock market capitalization at the end of
month; (3) TURNOVER is monthly stock transac-
tion value divided by its market capitalization.
Finally,the model also contains interactions of SIZE
and TURNOVERwith FORINSTand DOMINST.
Dynamic Panel Data
Following (Chen, Du, Li, & Ouyang, 2013),
this study includes lag of VOLAT as an additional
regressor. The inclusion of lag VOLAT producesa
dynamic panel data structure. To address endo-
geneity issue, different from (Chen, Du, Li, &
Ouyang, 2013), this study does not conduct regres-
sions in first-difference, but opts to apply dynamic
panel data estimation method known as the Sys-
tem GMM (S-GMM) (Arellano & Bover, 1995;
Blundell & Bond, 1998). The base empirical mod-
els are presented in Eq. (1) and (2):
titti FORINSTVOLATVOLAT ,2110,   
titiiControl ,,   (1)
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WhereVOLATi,t is daily stock return volatil-
ity of stock-i during month-t.VOLATi,t-1 is previ-
ous month (lag) stock return volatility. FORINSTi,tis
foreign institutional ownership of stock-i (in num-
ber of shares) divided by its total shares outstand-
ing at the end of month-t.FORINST^2 i ,tis
FORINSTi,t squared which is used to investigate
non-linear impact of FORINST on VOLAT. Mean-
while, Controli,t represents a set of control variables
as described in the previous section.
S-GMM dynamic panel estimators are suit-
able for the data in this study since it is a rela-
tively short period (20 months)compared to
itscross section data (422 stocks). They are also
suitable for independent variables that are not
strictly exogenous. In this study TURNOVER may
be endogenous to VOLAT since higher VOLAT
suggests more trading activity which will be re-
flected in TURNOVER(Esqueda, Assefa, &
Mollick, 2012). Another advantage of using S-GMM
is to handle unobservable time-invariant firm char-
acteristics that may affect both VOLAT and
FORINST(Chen, Du, Li, & Ouyang, 2013). More-
over, the use of S-GMM will avoid dynamic panel
data bias, known as Nickel bias, that arises from
using least squares estimators (Nickell, 1981).
S-GMM is originated from (Arellano & Bond,
1991) estimator which commences by transform-
ing all regressors,and then applies the General-
ized Method of Moments (GMM). The transfor-
mation is usually done by takingthe first differ-
ence of the variables, hence removing the fixed
effects andproducing additional equation that can
be estimated using suitable lags of endogenous
explanatory variables as the instrumental variables.
To produce more robust estimators, S-GMM
makes additional assumption that first differences
of instrument variables are not correlated with the
fixed effects. Hence, lags of first differences are
employed in addition to the lags of the endog-
enous explanatory variables.
S-GMM estimators are considered to be con-
sistent if the residuals do no exhibit second order
autocorrelation. To check this condition this study
employs(Arellano & Bond, 1991)AR(2) tests. Ad-
ditionally, instrumental variables employed must
be valid. To check the validity this study employs
both Sargan and Hansen tests. The joint null-hy-
potheses are: (1) instrument variables are indepen-
dently distributed of the error process, and (2)
instrument variables arecorrectlyomitted from the
model.
Results and Discussions
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics is presented in
Table 1. It shows that the average and the median
stock return volatility are 0.0259 and 0.0214 re-
spectively. The stock experiencing the highest re-
turn volatility of 2.1654is BRMS (PT. Bumi Re-
sources Minerals, Tbk.)which happens in July
2012.Further examination of the data reveals that
the stock also experiences high return volatility of
2.1089 in July 2013. Apparently, the stock which is
a subsidiary of Bakrie Groupis very volatile dur-
ing the study period.
During this research period, two stocks:
BAEK (PT. Bank EkonomiRaharja, Tbk.) and LPPF
(PT. Matahari Department Store, Tbk.) register the
highest foreign institutional ownerships of around
99.99 percent for several months. On the contrary,
TIRA (PT. Tira Austenite, Tbk.) records the larg-
est domestic institutional ownerships of around
99.41 percent during July-August 2013. In terms
of market capitalization, HMSP (PT. HM.
Sampoerna, Tbk.)is the largest stock during May-
August 2013, while TIFA (PT. Tifa Finance, Tbk.)
is the most actively traded stock in February 2013.
titti FORINSTVOLATVOLAT ,1110,   
titiiti ControlFORINST ,,,2 2^   (2)
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Variable Observations Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
VOLAT 8438 0.0259 0.0214 0.0447 0 2.1654 
FORINST 8438 0.1903 0.0924 0.2414 0  0.9999 
DOMINST 8438 0.2426 0.1351 0.2675 0 0.9941 
SIZE 8438 27.8886 27.7437 2.0432 23.1948 33.5688 
TURNOVER 8438 0.0296 0.0057 0.0703 0 0.9572 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
VOLAT is monthly standard deviation of daily return. FORINST is the proportion of foreign institutional ownership. DOMINST is the proportion of
domestic institutional ownership. FORFIN is the proportion of foreign financial institutional ownership. FORCORP is the proportion of foreign non-
financial corporation. DOMFIN is the proportion of domestic institutional ownership. DOMCORP is the proportion of domestic non-financial
corporation.SIZE is the natural log of market cap. TURNOVER is monthly transaction value relative to its market cap.
From the Pearson correlations presented in
Table 2, VOLAT is positively correlated with
TURNOVER, FORINST, and DOMINST. How-
ever, the correlation between VOLAT and
FORINST is stronger than VOLAT and DOMINST.
This may indicate that foreign institutional own-
ership tends to increase stock volatility, more than
domestic institutional ownership.
Meanwhile, the correlations betweenVOLAT
and SIZE, and betweenDOMINST and FORINST
are both negative. The negative correlation be-
tween VOLAT and SIZE may indicate that large
stocks are less volatile than small stocks. In the
meantime, the negative correlation between
DOMINST and FORINST may indicate that both
of them tend to transact in different directions.
 VOLAT FORINST DOMINST SIZE TURNOVER 
VOLAT 1.0000     
FORINST 0.0192 1.0000    
DOMINST 0.0129 -0.2016 1.0000   
SIZE -0.0263 0.2293 -0.0099 1.0000  
TURNOVER 0.0999 -0.0333 0.0691 -0.0557 1.0000 
 VOLAT is monthly standard deviation of daily return. FORINST is the proportion of foreign institutional ownership. DOMINST is the proportion of
domestic institutional ownership. FORFIN is the proportion of foreign financial institutional ownership. FORCORP is the proportion of foreign non-
financial corporation. DOMFIN is the proportion of domestic institutional ownership. DOMCORP is the proportion of domestic non-financial
corporation.SIZE is the natural log of market cap. TURNOVER is monthly transaction value relative to its market cap.
Table 2 Pearson correlations between variables
Dynamic Panel Results
The complete estimation results of the dy-
namic panel data models are presented in Table 3.
The results based on Eq. (1) and (2)in the second
and third columns of Table 3, show thatthe coeffi-
cients of Lag(VOLAT) are significantly positive.
They correspond with the notion that return vola-
tility tend to cluster. One period of high return
volatility tends to follow another period of high
return volatility.
With respect to the first hypothesis, the re-
sults document the positive linear impact of
FORINST on VOLAT.These findings support the
first hypothesis that predicts foreign institutional
ownership positive linear impact on stock return
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 (1) (2) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Intercept 
0.0042 
(0.0047) 
 
-0.0038 
(0.0048) 
Lag(VOLAT) 
0.8822*** 
(0.0503) 
0.8696*** 
(0. 0508) 
FORINST 
0.0211* 
(0.0161) 
0.0270** 
(0.0154) 
 
DOMINST 
0.0088 
(0. 0106) 
0.0050 
(0. 0116) 
SIZE 
0.00005 
(0. 0002) 
0.00025 
(0.0002) 
 
TURNOVER 
0. 0586*** 
(0.0090) 
0.0588*** 
(0.0091) 
FORINST*SIZE 
-0.0007* 
(0.0006) 
-0.0012** 
(0.0006) 
 
DOMINST*SIZE 
-0.0003  
(0.0004) 
-0.0004 
(0.0004) 
 
FORINST*TURNOVER 
0.0663* 
(0. 0353) 
0.0683* 
(0.0367) 
 
DOMINST*TURNOVER 
-0.0309 
(0.0204) 
-0.0296 
(0.0205) 
 
FORINST^2 
 0.0103** 
(0.0052) 
DOMINST^2 
 0.0063 
(0.0044) 
 Sargan test 
(p-value) 
14.90 
(0.729) 
15.01 
0.722 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
17.79 
(0.536) 
17.44 
(0.560) 
AB test for AR(2) 
(p-value) 
1.28 
(0.199) 
1.28 
(0.200) 
No. of Instruments 47 49 
No. of Observations 8014 8014 
 
Table 3 Dynamic panel data estimation results, based on two-step System GMM (S-GMM). The dependent variable is
monthly standard deviation of daily return (VOLAT). Coefficients of the regressors are reported with Windmeijer
corrected standard errors in parentheses.Coefficients of Period dummy (MONTH) variables are included but not
reported. FORINST is the proportion of foreign institutional ownership. DOMINST is the proportion of domestic
institutional ownership. SIZE is the natural log of market cap. TURNOVER is monthly transaction value relative to
its market cap. FORINST^2 is FORINST squared. DOMINST^2 is DOMINST squared.
*significant at 10 percent level; **significant at 5 percent level; ***significant at 1 percent level.
AB test for AR(2): test of residuals second order autocorrelation (Arellano & Bond, 1991).
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volatility. This finding is in line with the Chinese
market evidence (Chen, Du, Li, & Ouyang, 2013).
Although the findings in Indonesia and
China are the same, the China evidence is caused
by weak corporate governance and inadequate
regulation, while the Indonesia evidence is due to
market illiquidity. Foreign institutional presence
absorbs liquidity in the market, which in turn will
increase volatility through higher price impact.This
conjecture is based on the work of Rhee & Wang
(2009) documenting illiquidity increase due to for-
eign institutional ownership.
With regards to the second hypothesis, Table
3 indicates that the coefficients of FORINST*SIZE
in models (1) and (2)are both significantly nega-
tive at 10 percent and 5 percent level respectively.
These results support the second hypothesis, which
predicts that the impact of foreign institutional
ownership on stock return volatility is lower for
larger cap stocks. This finding suggests that large
cap stocks are less prone to the destabilizing im-
pact of foreign institutional ownership, while the
opposite is true for small cap stocks.
The coefficients ofDOMINST in both mod-
els are not significant. DOMINST*SIZE coefficients
are negative but not significant. The negative co-
efficients tend to support the conception that do-
mestic institutional investors appear to absorb
price impact by providing liquidity to foreign in-
stitutional investors.This scenario is likely to hap-
pen in large stocks since both domestic and for-
eign institutional investors prefer to invest in large
stocks (Dahlquist & Robertsson, 2001).
The TURNOVERcoefficientsare persistently
and significantly positive. This confirmation is con-
sistent with the findings of previous studies by
(Chen, Du, Li, & Ouyang, 2013;Wang, 2013; Li,
Nguyen, Pham, & Wei, 2011) who also use TURN-
OVER as one of their control variables. Highly
traded stocks tend to exhibit higher stock return
volatility.
The coefficients of FORINST*TURNOVER
are also positively significant. The impact of for-
eign institutional ownership on stock return vola-
tility appears to be stronger in stocks with higher
turnover. This outcome is most likely caused by
the illiquidity of the Indonesian market. As Rhee
& Wang(2009) point out, when foreign institutions
hold large proportion of Indonesian shares, the
liquidity will worsen. In low liquidity market, the
influence of stock transactions on price and return
volatility will be stronger.
Pertaining to the last hypothesis, the coef-
ficient of FORINST^2 in model (2)are significantly-
positive. The resultsupports the third hypothesis
which expects foreign institutional ownership-
tonon-linearly (convexly) impacts stock return
volatility. Meanwhile the coefficient of DOMINST
^2 is insignificant, supporting the notion that do-
mestic institutional ownership does not destabi-
lize Indonesian market.
The Sargan and Hansen tests on all models
do not reject joint null hypotheses that the instru-
ments are independently distributed of the error,
and they are properly omitted from the model.
Moreover, the AB (Arellano & Bond, 1991) AR(2)
tests show that the residuals do not exhibit sec-
ond order autocorrelation, which means the S-
GMM estimators are considered to be consistent.
Additional Test
Following Chen, Du, Li, & Ouyang(2013), I
conduct additional test to learn whether foreign
financial institutions and non-financial institutions
impact volatility differently. As explained previ-
ously, I define institutional investors to comprise
of: (1) insurance, (2) pension fund, (3) investment
bank, (4) mutual fund, (5) stock brokerage com-
pany, and (6) corporation. In the additional test,
institutions (1) to (5) are categorized as financial
institutions, while institution (6) is categorized as
non-financial corporation. Hence, (foreign) [domes-
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 (3) (4) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Intercept -0.0084 
(0.0050) 
-0.0093 
(0.0055) 
Lag(VOLAT) 0.8767*** 
(0.0518) 
0.8565*** 
(0.0529) 
FORFIN 0.0619** (0.0280) 
0.0530** 
(0.0258) 
FORCORP -0.0014 (0.0241) 
0.0014 
(0.0207) 
DOMFIN 0.0081 (0.0232) 
0.00348 
(0.0205) 
DOMCORP 0.0125 
(0.0113) 
0.0067 
(0.0136) 
SIZE 0.00022 
(0.00018) 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
TURNOVER 0.0597*** (0.0089) 
0.0599*** 
(0.0090) 
FORFIN*SIZE -0.0022** (0.0010) 
-0.0018** 
(0.0009) 
FORCORP*SIZE 0.00003 (0.0008) 
-0.0009 
(0.0007) 
DOMFIN*SIZE -0.00039 
(0.0008) 
-0.0004 
(0.0008) 
DOMCORP*SIZE -0.00045 (0.0004) 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
FORFIN*TURNOVER 0.0266 (0.0327) 
0.0278 
(0.0328) 
FORCORP*TURNOVER 0.1794** (0.0832) 
0.1997** 
(0.0891) 
DOMFIN*TURNOVER -0.0603 
(0.0435) 
-0.0584 
(0.0440) 
DOMCORP*TURNOVER -0.0240 (0.0207) 
-0.02335 
(0.0207) 
FORFIN^2  -0.0007 (0.0056) 
FCORP^2  0.0319*** (0.0117) 
DOMFIN^2  0.0088 
(0.0054) 
DOMCORP^2  0.0070 (0.0055) 
Sargan test 
(p-value) 
15.00 
(0.722) 
15.05 
(0.719) 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
18.85 
(0.467) 
18.07 
(0.518) 
AB test for AR(2) 
(p-value) 
1.30 
(0.193) 
1.28 
(0.200) 
No. of Instruments 53 57 
No. of Observations 8014 8014 
 
Table 4 Dynamic panel data estimation results, based on two-step System GMM (S-GMM). The dependent variable is
monthly standard deviation of daily return (VOLAT). Coefficients of the regressors are reported with Windmeijer
corrected standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients of Period dummy (MONTH) variables are included but not
reported. FORFIN is the proportion of foreign financial institutional ownership. FORCORP is the proportion of
foreign non-financial corporation. DOMFIN is the proportion of domestic institutional ownership. DOMCORP is
the proportion of domestic non-financial corporation. FORFIN^2 is FORFIN squared. FORCORP^2 is FORCORP
squared. DOMFIN^2 is DOMFIN squared. DOMCORP^2 is DOMCORP squared.
*significant at 10 percent level; **significant at 5 percent level; ***significant at 1 percent level.
AB test for AR(2): test of residuals second order autocorrelation (Arellano & Bond, 1991).
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tic] institutional ownership (FORINST) [DOMINST]
is decomposed into (foreign) [domestic] financial
institutional ownership (FORFIN) [DORFIN] and
(foreign) [domestic] non-financial corporation
(FORCORP) [DOMCORP] ownership. The com-
plete results of the additional test are presented
in Table 4.
After the decomposition of FORINST, mod-
els (3) and (4) show that the coefficients of FORFIN
are significantly positive, while the coefficients of
FORCORP are insignificant. This shows that for-
eign financial institutional ownership significantly
impact stock return volatility, while foreign non-
financial corporation ownership does not seem to
affect return volatility.However, the destabilizing
impact of FORFIN is weaker for larger cap stocks.
This can be confirmed from the coefficients
ofFORFIN*SIZEwhich are significantly negativein
both models. In contrast, all interaction terms with
SIZE are not significantin both models.
Interestingly, the non-linear impact on vola-
tility is generated by foreign non-financial institu-
tional ownership. This inference is drawn from the
coefficient of FCORP^2 in model (4) which is posi-
tively significant. Consistent with the base model
results, domestic institutional ownerships repre-
sented by DOMFIN and DOMCORP do not lin-
early or non-linearly impact return volatility.
It is also interesting to learn that the coeffi-
cients of FCORP*TURNOVER are significant in both
models. It can be inferred that foreign non-finan-
cial ownership in highly traded stocks tends to in-
crease stock return volatility. In other words, the
foreign corporation ownership in high turnover
stocks may destabilize the Indonesian market.
Concluding Remarks
This research aims to study the impact of
foreign institutional ownership on contemporane-
ous stock return volatility in Indonesian market.
In this study, foreign and domestic institutional
ownership consists of: (1) insurance, (2) pension
fund, (3) investment bank, (4) mutual fund, (5)
stock brokerage company, and (6) corporation;
while return volatility is measured as standard
deviation of daily stock returns.
Results from dynamic panel data models
support all three main hypotheses. Firstly, foreign
institutional ownership (FORINST) linearly in-
creases contemporaneous monthly stock return
volatility. Secondly, foreign institutional owner-
ship linear impact is weaker for stocks with large
market capitalization. Thirdly, foreign institutional
ownership convexly increases monthly stock re-
turn volatility.
Further test results show that foreign finan-
cial institutional ownership (FORFIN) linearly
escalatesstock return volatility, while foreign non-
financial corporationownership (FORCORP) con-
vexly increases stock return volatility. The addi-
tional test also indicates thatboth domestic finan-
cial and non-financial institutional ownershipsdo
not impact stock return volatility. Hence, domes-
tic institutional investors may play a significant
stabilizing role in the Indonesian market.
Indonesian market policy makers and stake
holders should realize that although Indonesia
needs foreign institutional capital to flow into its
economy, the foreign capital flow may destabilize
the market. Henceforth, they also need to continu-
ously strengthen domestic institutional investors
for they are the potential stabilizers of the Indo-
nesian market.Moreover, increasing market capi-
talization of stocks may reduce the destabilizing
impact of foreign institutional ownerships.
One of the limitations of this study is that it
omits foreign and domestic individual ownerships.
The omission is based on the assumption that in-
dividual ownerships in Indonesia are insignificant
compared to institutional ownerships. Further
studies should consider individual investors roles
in the Indonesian market.
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